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Preventing Child Neglect in DNSSECbis Using Lookaside Validation (DLV)
Introduction
DNS is a coherent autonomous distributed hierarchical database, designed in 1987 [1] to map Internet host names to their Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and to allow for future expansion. While generally successful, one long standing weakness in DNS has been a lack of data authenticity. Data retrieved from DNS is inherently untrustworthy, and so sensitive data has not been stored in DNS at all.
Starting in 1994, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) developed several DNS Security standards including DNSSEC ( [2] and [3] ) and DNSSECbis ( [4] and later). At the time of this writing it is widely believed that DNSSECbis deployment can finally begin.
However, the DNSSECbis data model implies that a zone's parent must be secured before a zone itself can be secured, which ultimately makes the security of the root zone (ultimate ancestor of all zones) the keystone of DNSSECbis deployment. For political reasons, we do not expect the root zone to be secured any time this year or next, and so any DNSSECbis deployment efforts will be restricted to testbeds and product development, and will therefore lack appreciable scale. In order to jump start the wide scale operational deployment of DNSSECbis, we have developed DNSSEC Lookaside Validation (DLV).
DNS Delegation and Resolution
In order to understand the DLV mechanism, it is necessary to first possess some basic knowledge about DNS's data and traversal models. Since zones are subject to separate administrative control, every zone has a zone owner (or zone editor) controlling the content, and one or more zone publishers who operate the authoritative nameservers from which zone data is then made available to recursive nameservers.
A domain name is a sequence of zero or more labels. When displayed, it is customary to show a dot (.) between labels, or to display only a dot (.) if there are no labels. (The on-the-wire encoding of a domain name is somewhat different, and is not relevant to this discussion.) Not all label boundaries indicate zone boundaries, such that GW.HOME.VIX.COM and WWW.VIX.COM could be part of the VIX.COM zone, or the former might be in a child zone called HOME.VIX.COM. Naturally, zone boundaries can only occur at label boundaries, and every domain name is owned by exactly one zone. A zone's apex name is owned by that zone, and the similar name in the parent zone is called delegation glue.
At any domain name, zero or more resource records (RRs) can exist, and are organized into sets called resource record sets (RRsets) according to resource record type (RRtype). A domain name can only be empty of RRsets if it is nonterminal, and will only be visible through the exposure of its subdomain names. A terminal domain name can have an asterisk (*) as its first label, which instructs name servers to synthesize responses to any query name matching the remainder of the name. The same NS RRset or a proper superset thereof must exist at the apex of the child zone. A few more RRtypes will be described later, but the majority of defined RRtypes are used for application-layer data.
DNS Traversal Model-Recursive Resolution
A domain name server can be authoritative for one or more zones, or it can be a nonauthoritative caching forwarder, or both. The protocol semantics for being both authoritative and nonauthoritative are weak and ill defined, and so this hybrid configuration will not be described here. An authority server has the relatively straight forward task of answering queries it receives by referencing the contents of the zones it is authoritative for.
Authoritative answers are either negative ("no such name exists"), empty ("name exists but no RRs match this query"), positive ("here's what you asked for"), or referral ("that name is in a subdomain, here's the list of name servers you should talk to instead of me"). If a server is authoritative for both a zone and its parent or grandparent or other ancestors, then the best-matching ("closest enclosing") zone will be used to satisfy each query.
A caching forwarder's task is more complex. These servers receive queries from stub resolvers ("DNS clients") and either answer from cache, or forward the query to the best-matching ("closest enclosing") set of name servers for the query name. The answer to a forwarded query will come back to the caching forwarder, to be cached for subsequent reuse, and possibly forwarded back to the originating stub resolver. If the answer is a referral, then the caching forwarder will follow the referral and repeat its query to the delegated name servers. This process is called recursion and ultimately yields a non-referral response which can be forwarded back to the originating stub resolver.
Note that a full resolver could perform the caching and recursion tasks directly rather than working through a caching forwarder, but this configuration is extremely rare. Also note that inside an enterprise, some caching forwarders can be configured to use other caching forwarders, to centralize off-net traffic and benefit from greater reuse of DNS data.
A recursive name server must be preconfigured with a list of the name servers for the root zone, which as the ultimate ancestor of all zones, becomes the match of last resort (only enclosing) for all queries. After such a server starts up, it will traditionally use its preconfigured list as a bootstrap (or "priming") query whereby it will learn the current list of root name servers. As it performs various recursive name lookups, it will then learn (and cache) deeper zone cuts with lists of non-root name servers. It is only because of this caching that a small number of root name servers is able to serve a global internet host population counted in the hundreds of millions. Errors in this caching"/"reuse logic in popular recursive name server implementations are responsible for the majority of root name server queries [5] .
DNSSECbis Data and Traversal Models
The essential technological differences between DNSSEC and DNSSECbis are the data and traversal models for the Secure DNS metadata. Since DLV extends these models, we will describe the unaltered models first. This discussion assumes a basic familiarity with public-key cryptography systems, whereby a verification (or decryption) key can be public information since it differs from the private signing (or encryption) key, and one-way hashing can be used to verify an identity without requiring a complete copy for comparison.
DNSSECbis Metadata-DNSKEY, RRSIG, NSEC, DS RRs
DNSKEY is used at a zone apex to supply a public key that corresponds to some private signing key held by the editor of the zone. Key pairs containing a private and public key are generated when a zone is first secured, and then regenerated periodically thereafter to guard against "brute force" guessing attacks, private key exposure, and other forms of key rot. An RRSIG RR is generated by the zone signer for every RRset in the zone, and possibly regenerated by the authoritative name server after an RRset has been altered using DNS Dynamic Update [6] . There can be multiple RRSIG RRs covering the same RRset if multiple DNSKEYs are in use, as is true during "key rollover" events.
NSEC RRs are generated by the zone signer, and possibly regenerated during DNS Dynamic Update events, to describe ranges of nonexistent names within a zone, and to describe the available RRtypes at existing names within a zone. A crypto-authentic NSEC RR is considered proof that no names falling within that NSEC's range exist, and that no RRtypes beyond those listed in the NSEC exist at the name where the NSEC appears. NSEC is necessary to guard against false-negative attacks by providing cryptoauthenticated proof of what RRsets and domain names do and do not exist. The expected implementation of NSEC is that each NSEC will declare all names up to the next actual name to be nonexistent, which creates a zone enumeration vulnerability since normal DNS queries can then be used to "walk the NSEC chain" and discover all names and RRsets in a zone. Other implementations of NSEC are currently being investigated in order to avoid this vulnerability.
DS RRs are generated from DNSKEY public keys, using a one-way hash. A DS RR describing each DNSKEY in a zone is stored in the parent zone alongside the NS RR delegation glue. Note that the parent zone's NS RRset for a child zone is not authoritative and is not signed in the parent zone, but the parent zone's DS RRset for a child zone is authorative and is crypto-authenticated. In a further twist, the parent zone's NSEC for the delegation point will indicate the existence of both NS and DS RRsets even though only the DS RRset is authoritative in the parent zone.
DNSSECbis Validation
In the ideal course of events, a DNSSECbis caching forwarder or full resolver will send a query to a DNSSECbis authority server and receive enough data and metadata to fully validate the response. The answer, if positive, will contain a responsive RRset, a covering RRSIG, and if space permits, the DNSKEYs needed to verify the RRSIGs. If the answer is empty or negative, a signed NSEC will prove the nonexistence of the name or type covered by the query. If the answer is a referral, an NSEC will prove the existence of NS and DS RRsets, and RRSIGs covering the NSEC and DS will prove crypto-authenticity. The DS RRset in such a referral will authenticate a child zone's DNSKEYs, and so a validator needs only be configured with the ultimate public key for the root zone in order to be able to fully validate all secure date anywhere in DNS.
Some problems occur when a name server is authoritative for both a zone and its ancestors (for example, the root (.) zone and ROOT-SERVERS.NET, or for LAB.ISC.ORG and ORG). In this case, a secure response to a query inside the lower zone will be generated using data from the lower zone, such that a validator might not learn the DS and DNSKEY for the middle zone (net in this example), nor the DS for the lower zone. While a validator can query for the missing data in such cases, it is always possible that the lower zone is not secured, and that queries for the "missing" DNSSECbis metadata will come up empty. There is a need to distinguish between metadata that was not sent, against metadata which does not exist, against empty metadata injected by a "man in the middle" attacker. This distinction can be made, but the software implementation is very subtle.
Validators can be configured with multiple public keys, and they do not all have to be for the root zone. For example, if it became universally known that the NL zone was secured by a certain DNSKEY, then all validators in the universe could be configured to trust this key, and NL could enjoy the benefits of Secure DNS without waiting for the root (.) zone to be secured. However, due to the moderate number of TLDs and the high number of validators and the likelihood that these keys will have to "roll over" on a regular schedule, this approach will not scale. DNSSECbis really does depend on the root (.) zone becoming secure before Internet-scale deployment can occur.
Because of the difficulty in "rolling over" a trusted key that has been configured into every validator in the universe, work is ongoing to either ensure that the root (.) zone's signing key never needs to be rolled over, or that it can be rolled over using in-band signalling, or that it can be rolled over using out-of-band but still automated processing. This problem is still generally considered unsolved. Another problem with securing the root (.) zone is political: "key ownership." In unsecure DNS, stewardship of the root zone is through an uneasy alliance, and recourse in the event of disputes over this stewardship is fairly well understood. Secure DNS will complicate this situation by adding a powerful magic totem called "the root zone signing key" to the mix. Noone knows what this means yet, and even discussing it openly is very difficult for all parties concerned.
DNSSEC Lookaside Validation-DLV
DLV is a local policy mechanism that changes a validator's behaviour in the event that no DNSSECbis metadata is available, or if the available metadata makes use of a key which does not exist in the parent zone. It is not a protocol extension per se, and is not the result of the IETF standards process. Rather, it is a local extension used by cooperating zone administrators and validator operators who wish to publish and consume keys before the normal DNSSECbis mechanisms are usable due to an unsecured parent zone. DLV is expected to become irrelevant, and die, after the root zone and most TLD zones are secured.
By definition, if a DNSSECbis validator would have found a secure result without DLV, then this result is unchanged by the DLV logic. However, if DNSSECbis would have resulted in an unsecure result, then DLV processing can produce a secure result if the zone administrator has registered their keys in a DLV namespace subscribed to by that DLV-capable validator.
DLV Metadata-DLV RRs
A new DLV RR is used, which is structurally identical to the DS RR but has none of the normal DS RR metadata semantics-in other words it is never returned automatically as a side effect of queries for other RRtypes. The type code number for the DLV RR will be in "private RRtype space" and registered with, but not allocated by, the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).
DLV RRs are stored in one or more secured zones in normal DNS (for example, DLV.ISC.ORG). The name of the DNSKEY RR described by a DLV RR is just the owner name of the DLV RR, minus the name of the DLV namespace. So a DLV RR with owner name VIX.COM.DLV.ISC.ORG stored in DLV namespace DLV.ISC.ORG would describe a DNSKEY RR whose owner name is VIX.COM.
A DLV namespace can consist of more than one zone, if zone cuts are necessary to create interior administrative boundaries. For example, if ten million (10,000,000) registrations all occurred for child zones of COM, the DLV namespace operator might place an interior zone cut at COM.DLV.ISC.ORG in order to balance the resulting nameserver load. All zones in a DLV namespace must be secure, and the apex DNSKEY must be trusted by all DLV validators. Therefore, interior zone cuts in the DLV namespace will have normal DS and DNSKEY RRs, and all RRsets in a DLV namespace will have RRSIGs.
DLV Validation-Handling DNSSECbis Errors
A DLV-capable validator will be configured to know the name of one or more DLV namespaces, and to know the trusted key used to sign each DLV namespace. When DLV has been enabled in a validator, several exceptions which would normally yield nonsecure results are handled specially.
Since a DNSSECbis validator always signals its desire to receive DNSSECbis metadata when it sends or forwards a query, a response that lacks such metadata is usually treated as either evidence of an unsecure zone (if the parent zone's delegation did not include a DS RRset), or as evidence of an attack or misconfiguration (if a DS RRset indicated that the zone was secure). Because of "the grandparent problem" where a name server who is authoritative for both a zone and its ancestor (for example, LAB.ISC.ORG and ORG), every DNSSECbis validator has to do some extra work to distinguish these cases.
For DLV, a validator who has determined that there really is no matching parent DS RR for a zone, will perform a lookup for the corresponding DLV RR in the locally configured DLV namespace that best matches the zone's apex. Therefore if a validator knows a DLV namespace for the root (.) zone and another DLV namespace for MIL, missing DS RRs for the NAVY.MIL zone will cause lookups in the known MIL DLV namespace, whereas missing DS RRs anywhere else will cause lookups in the known root (.) DLV namespace.
Aggressive Negative Caching
To guard against "man in the middle" attacks where a secure response is intercepted and replaced by a nonsecure response (sometimes called a "downgrade" attack), a DLVcapable validator will treat any unsecure response as a potential attack and will do a DLV lookup to prove that a zone actually is unsecure. This results in a significant increase in network traffic from each DLV-capable validator, and requires the use of "aggressive negative caching" to try to manage this increase.
In normal DNSSECbis, a negative proof consists of a signed NSEC RR covering a query name. This negative proof is reusable for other queries for the same name, but not for other queries covered by the NSEC RR's negation range. This is due to a deliberate protocol design decision and is meant to preserve flexibility for future protocol extensions.
A DLV-capable validator will bend this rule somewhat, by treating a cached NSEC RR as evidence that there is no need to make new lookups for DLV RRs covered by a valid NSEC's negation range. Note that this all happens "off the wire" and that a DLV-capable validator will still honour the NSEC non-reuse rules for queries it is asked to make or to forward. Only the queries generated internally by the DLV logic are subject to aggressive negative caching. We call this "off-the-wire aggressive negative caching."
For example, if a DLV-capable validator asks the DLV.ISC.ORG zone's servers about BBB.DLV.ISC.ORG and receives an NSEC "negative proof" asserting the nonexistence of any names after AAA.DLV.ISC.ORG and before DDD.DLV.ISC.ORG, then it could reasonably reuse this NSEC when replying to subsequent queries for the same name (BBB.DLV.ISC.ORG) but not for subsequent queries for other names falling in the range covered by this NSEC (such as CCC.DLV.ISC.ORG). However, if such a validator were pondering the existence of a DLV RR for CCC.DLV.ISC.ORG then it could reasonably reuse the cached NSEC, and avoid sending a query about this name.
It is expected that other DNSSEC-aware applications will also practice "off the wire aggressive negative caching" to avoid network traffic; for this reason among several others, the DNS time-to-live (TTL) and RRSIG signature validity period should not be of extravagantly long duration.
DLV Operations
To deploy DLV, participating members of the DNS industry will have to change some of their operational practices, and a new DLV registry will have to be created.
DLV Registry Operations
A DLV registry's job is to accept DLV RRs (which are structurally identical to DS RRs) from DLV Registrants using some kind of repudiable protocol, and to publish these DLV RRs in a secure zone that is published with very high availability.
The DLV registry should be a public benefit corporation with strong ties to the research and protocol development communities, such that deployment statistics will be tracked and publically disclosed, and query names seen at the DLV namespace's nameservers will not be used commercially, and the registry function can be altered or ended according to the needs of the DNSSECbis community.
DLV Registrant Operations
Zone administrators who generate new DNSKEY key pairs and associated DS RRs will have to form a relationship to the DLV Registry and submit DLV RRs to the DLV Registry for publication. This is analagous to submitting DS RRs to a parent zone registrar (for example, in the normal DNSSECbis data model, when a new DNSKEY is created for VIX.COM, the corresponding DS RR would be sent to a COM registrar for ultimate inclusion in the COM zone.
Note that after a zone's parent zone is secured, and if the parent zone's DNSKEY is submitted to the DLV Registry, then the zone's own DNSKEY will no longer need to be published in the DLV Registry-though it would still be effective, if desireable for business reasons. Also note that once all ancestor zones from a given zone up to the root (.) zone are secured, then there is no need to continue publishing keys in the DLV Registry-although this, too, would still be effective, if desireable for business reasons.
DLV Recursion"/"Validation Operations
Operators of validating full resolvers and caching forwarders will have to install software having DLV capabilities, and enable those capabilities, and configure one or more trusted keys for the chosen DLV namespace. It is also advisable to monitor the DLV Registry to become aware of any changes to the DLV technology or to the configured trusted keys for the DLZ zone. (The same can be said for changes to the DNSSECbis technology or to the root (.) zone keys or to methods of automatically rolling over the root (.) zone keys.)
Conclusion
The Domain Name System needs security extensions in order to be a trusted bearer of sensitive information whose authenticity is a high risk. DNSSECbis is a workable technical solution that suffers from political naivety and poses some difficult challenges on its way to universal deployment. The expected deployment model for DNSSECbis includes an initial period of non-automated key exchange whereby top-level and other domains publish their keys via the Web and nameserver operators import these keys using "cut and paste". The extremely high cost of this initial deployment period compared to the moderately low expected benefit from being an early participant creates the need for alternative key publication systems during initial deployment. DNSSEC Lookaside Validation is a possible workaround for these challenges, since it allows cooperating registrants and end users to share zone key information in a way that preserves trust but does not depend on parent zones or the root zone to be secured first. Participating nameserver operators will only need to configure one new trusted key and define one DLV namespace, in order to make validation possible for any participating zone. A participating zone's owner will generate their keys normally, and sign their zones normally, but if it is not possible to register their public key with their zone's parent zone, they can instead register that key with a DLV registry and thus become "validateable" by all nameservers configured to participate in DLV.
DLV was not produced by the Internet Engineering Task Force, and DLV makes some necessarily controversial alterations to the zone delegation model. Nevertheless we believe DLV can help advance the deployment of DNSSECbis's native key management methods, and that by doing so, DLV will hasten its own ultimate irrelevance and doom.
The author's employer (ISC) is committed to publishing a version of the Open Source BIND9 software system containing full DLV logic, and also to creating and operating a DLV registry for use by interested registrants and nameserver operators. No field trials had taken place at the time of this paper's publication, but internal lab testing has been very encouraging.
The Internet community urgently needs Secure DNS, and Secure DNS urgently needs the root (.) zone and toplevel domain (TLD) zones to be secured in order to allow interested second-level domain (SLD) zones to be secured and in order for interested nameserver operators to validate secure data. Until then, we'll have DLV.
